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test(infra): move T1.4 test to test_hostnossl_precedence.py; conftest is fixtures-only

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Co-authored-by: Junie <junie@jetbrains.com>
This commit is contained in:
chrisfu 2026-04-30 16:08:19 -07:00
parent 748de6beff
commit 2e203f7355
2 changed files with 62 additions and 54 deletions
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54
tests/onboarding/conftest.py
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@ -223,57 +223,3 @@ def _is_external_range(cidr: str) -> bool:
return not any(net.subnet_of(private) for private in rfc1918) return not any(net.subnet_of(private) for private in rfc1918)
def test_hostnossl_reject_precedes_permissive_host_rules() -> None:
"""T1.4 — hostnossl reject must appear before any permissive host rule
that could match external IPs.
Regression detector for the externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster→Local bug from
Phase 1: if a permissive `host` rule (non-SSL, non-reject) for an external
CIDR appears before the `hostnossl ... reject` line, an external plaintext
connection could match the permissive rule and bypass the TLS requirement.
This is a static analysis test — no live cluster required. It runs on
every commit as part of the fast (non-integration) subset.
"""
if not GKE_KNOE_DB_YAML.exists():
pytest.skip(f"pg_hba source not found: {GKE_KNOE_DB_YAML}")
rules = _parse_pg_hba_from_yaml(GKE_KNOE_DB_YAML)
assert rules, f"No pg_hba rules found in {GKE_KNOE_DB_YAML}"
hostnossl_reject_seen = False
violations: list[str] = []
for rule in rules:
tokens = rule.split()
if not tokens or tokens[0].startswith("#"):
continue
conn_type = tokens[0].lower()
# Track when we see a hostnossl ... reject line covering 0.0.0.0/0
if conn_type == "hostnossl" and tokens[-1].lower() == "reject":
# Any hostnossl reject counts — we're conservative here.
hostnossl_reject_seen = True
continue
# A permissive `host` rule (not hostssl, not local, not reject) that
# covers an external CIDR before hostnossl reject has been seen is a
# violation.
if conn_type == "host" and not hostnossl_reject_seen:
# tokens: conn_type db user address [mask] auth-method [options]
# address is tokens[3] for the standard 4-field form.
if len(tokens) >= 5:
address = tokens[3]
auth_method = tokens[-1].lower()
if auth_method != "reject" and _is_external_range(address):
violations.append(rule)
assert not violations, (
"pg_hba has permissive `host` rule(s) for external IPs appearing BEFORE "
"the `hostnossl ... reject` line. An external plaintext connection could "
"match these rules and bypass the TLS requirement.\n\n"
"Violating rules:\n" + "\n".join(f" {r}" for r in violations) + "\n\n"
"Fix: move `hostnossl all all 0.0.0.0/0 reject` above any permissive "
"`host` rule that covers non-RFC1918 addresses."
)

62
tests/onboarding/test_hostnossl_precedence.py Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
"""
T1.4 — hostnossl reject precedence (static analysis, no cluster needed).
Regression detector for the externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster→Local bug from
Phase 1. See docs/plans/onboarding-tdd.md §3 T1.4 for the full spec.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from tests.onboarding.conftest import (
GKE_KNOE_DB_YAML,
_is_external_range,
_parse_pg_hba_from_yaml,
)
import pytest
def test_hostnossl_reject_precedes_permissive_host_rules() -> None:
"""T1.4 — hostnossl reject must appear before any permissive host rule
that could match external IPs.
If a permissive `host` rule (non-SSL, non-reject) for an external CIDR
appears before the `hostnossl ... reject` line, an external plaintext
connection could match the permissive rule and bypass the TLS requirement.
Static analysis — no live cluster required. Runs on every commit.
"""
if not GKE_KNOE_DB_YAML.exists():
pytest.skip(f"pg_hba source not found: {GKE_KNOE_DB_YAML}")
rules = _parse_pg_hba_from_yaml(GKE_KNOE_DB_YAML)
assert rules, f"No pg_hba rules found in {GKE_KNOE_DB_YAML}"
hostnossl_reject_seen = False
violations: list[str] = []
for rule in rules:
tokens = rule.split()
if not tokens or tokens[0].startswith("#"):
continue
conn_type = tokens[0].lower()
if conn_type == "hostnossl" and tokens[-1].lower() == "reject":
hostnossl_reject_seen = True
continue
if conn_type == "host" and not hostnossl_reject_seen:
if len(tokens) >= 5:
address = tokens[3]
auth_method = tokens[-1].lower()
if auth_method != "reject" and _is_external_range(address):
violations.append(rule)
assert not violations, (
"pg_hba has permissive `host` rule(s) for external IPs appearing BEFORE "
"the `hostnossl ... reject` line. An external plaintext connection could "
"match these rules and bypass the TLS requirement.\n\n"
"Violating rules:\n" + "\n".join(f" {r}" for r in violations) + "\n\n"
"Fix: move `hostnossl all all 0.0.0.0/0 reject` above any permissive "
"`host` rule that covers non-RFC1918 addresses."
)