Bringing the long-running session-feature branch back into main in one deliberate sweep. The branch carried the cluster work that's been live for weeks (cross-cluster CNPG metrics, Grafana w/ Google OAuth, supabase oauth2-proxy, cluster recovery, pg.0.knoe.dev + per-engineer onboarding, GCS-backed CNPG backups via Workload Identity, the env-contamination guard, the Junie brief queue, the cnpg-grafana CSRF + memory-request fixes from today), while main accumulated Junie's parallel knoe-auth Phase 2 OIDC work (full provider surface: discovery, authorize, token, userinfo, JWKS, RS256 signing, code exchange, session services). Key decision: the two branches did COMPETING rebrands off the same starting point (5ba9b63, 2026-04-27): - claude branch (commit b355855, earlier): org.prole.authority.* → dev.knoe.auth.* (artifact renamed to knoe-auth.jar) - main (commit9daa94b, recent): org.prole.authority.* → dev.knoe.authority.* (kept "authority" artifact name) dev.knoe.auth wins: cluster runs from this name, the Maven artifact is already knoe-auth.jar, and the broader rename is the documented namespace direction (per ~/.claude/projects/-Users-chrisfu-dev-knoe-db/ memory/MEMORY.md). All of main's recent Phase 2 OIDC content was ported from authority/src/.../dev/knoe/authority/ into authority/src/.../dev/knoe/auth/ with package declarations rewritten. == File-level resolution summary == Textual conflicts (4): authority/pom.xml - Took our artifactId="auth" - Took our branch's removal of spring-security-kerberos-client (verified: Junie's Phase 2 OIDC code does not import it; the dep was already-dead config) docs/pipeline-phases.md - Took our branch's "Phase 1 not started" status. Main had a misplaced "✅ Complete" with a knoe-auth-Phase-1 commit ref in the autobuild Phase 1 section — different domain. docs/plans/knoe-auth-round-1.md - Took our branch's dev.knoe.auth file table (vs main's dev.knoe.authority listing). Pure rename mismatch. supabase/helm/knoe-supabase/templates/kong/config.yaml - Took our branch's onboard route + plain dashboard wiring. Main had an oauth2proxy.enabled toggle that put oauth2-proxy as a Kong upstream — but the deployed architecture (commit 25f1b2e) has oauth2-proxy in FRONT of Kong, not behind. Main's wrapper reflected an architecture that was never deployed. - Took our branch's removal of basic-auth from dashboard route (queue #15 brief still tracks the matching values.yaml / kong/deployment.yaml cleanup). Java tree reconciliation (44 file-pairs): 20 dual-path source files + 2 dual-path tests Body-identical between main's authority/ and our branch's auth/ after stripping package decls — main's commit9daa94bwas a pure rebrand. Took our branch's auth/ version for all 22. 8 main-only source files (Phase 2 OIDC), ported into auth/: web/JwksController.java web/OidcAuthorizeController.java web/OidcDiscoveryController.java web/OidcTokenController.java web/OidcUserInfoController.java session/OidcCodeService.java session/OidcTokenService.java session/SessionService.java 12 main-only test files, ported into auth/: HealthControllerTest.java enroll/EnrollValueTypesTest.java enroll/EnrollmentControllerTest.java enroll/TotpServiceTest.java kerberos/KadminClientTest.java kerberos/KerberosSpnegoResultTest.java web/LoginControllerTest.java admin/AdminControllerTest.java user/PrincipalNormalizerTest.java regression/IdentityRegressionTest.java session/OidcCodeServiceTest.java session/SessionServiceTest.java Port mechanics: read main:authority/...<file> via git show, then sed rewrite `package dev.knoe.authority` → `package dev.knoe.auth` and `import dev.knoe.authority` → `import dev.knoe.auth`. Body content unchanged. authority/src/main/java/dev/knoe/authority/ — DELETED (duplicate) authority/src/test/java/dev/knoe/authority/ — DELETED (duplicate) == Verification == - grep -rln '<<<<<<<' across .java/.md/.yaml/.yml/.sh/.xml/.tpl: clean - find authority/src -path '*/dev/knoe/authority*': empty (subtree gone) - grep 'package dev.knoe.authority' across repo: clean - bash -n install.sh deploy.sh etc/preflight_kubecontext.sh: clean - git ls-files -u | wc -l: 0 unmerged paths - helm lint supabase/helm/knoe-supabase: pre-existing failure on studioIngress.enabled undefined in values.yaml (introduced by Junie on main; unrelated to this merge — flagging as follow-up). == Followups (carried into TODO ranked queue or noted here) == - helm lint failure: studioIngress block in values.yaml is missing enable flag; templates/studio/{ingress,oauth2proxy-deployment, oauth2proxy-service}.yaml all reference studioIngress.enabled with no default. Pre-existing on main; not introduced by this merge. - The five Junie briefs filed on this branch are now reachable from main at docs/plans/junie/{02,06,07,13,15}-*.md. Junie can pick them up in any order. - knoe-auth Phase 2 OIDC source (now at dev.knoe.auth.*) is not yet deployed to the cluster. Deployment is its own task. - The branch claude/crazy-bose-fec256 stays in place (worktree at .claude/worktrees/crazy-bose-fec256 may have ongoing context for Claude Code sessions). Safe to delete once next session starts cleanly from main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Direct database access — psql + Rust apps
Per-engineer access to the knoe-db Postgres cluster (PG18 / Percona) at
pg.0.knoe.dev:5432.
Phase 1 (current): per-engineer postgres roles with strong passwords (30-day rotation), TLS required, named-roles-only ACL on the public LB. Phase 2 (queued for Junie): replaces the password mechanism with PG18 native OAUTHBEARER (libpq drives a Google Device Flow) + a small validator library bundled into our
knoe-dbimage. Connection target stays the same; engineers'psqlinvocation only changes from-Wto settingoauth_issuer/oauth_client_idin the connection string.
First-day flow (engineer-facing)
See docs/onboarding.md — the canonical engineer
checklist. Two-line summary:
- chrisfu runs
etc/onboard_engineer.sh <username> <email>. Script outputs a one-time URL (and QR-code rendering of it) plus a 24h temp password. - Engineer opens URL on phone or laptop → page at
db.0.knoe.dev/onboard.htmlshows their password + connection string with [Copy] buttons. Engineer pastes into psql, immediately rotates via\password, saves their new password to personal 1Password (no shared vault required).
The CA cert lives at etc/knoe-db-ca.crt in this
repo — engineers reference it with sslrootcert=etc/knoe-db-ca.crt after
cloning. It's a public CA root, not a secret. Auto-rotates with CNPG; we
re-export and commit when it does.
Connection string (engineers substitute their own role):
psql "host=pg.0.knoe.dev port=5432 user=$USER dbname=postgres \
sslmode=verify-full sslrootcert=etc/knoe-db-ca.crt"
Rust apps (sqlx / tokio-postgres / deadpool-postgres)
Connection string with the same TLS configuration:
let url = format!(
"postgres://{user}:{password}@pg.0.knoe.dev:5432/postgres\
?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert={ca_path}",
user = std::env::var("KNOE_PG_USER")?,
password = std::env::var("KNOE_PG_PASSWORD")?,
ca_path = format!("{}/.knoe/knoe-db-ca.crt", std::env::var("HOME")?),
);
let pool = sqlx::PgPool::connect(&url).await?;
For tokio-postgres directly, configure the MakeTlsConnector with the same
CA bundle (use postgres-native-tls or tokio-postgres-rustls).
Service apps on GKE (Phase 2.5 territory): the same connection string, but
KNOE_PG_USER / KNOE_PG_PASSWORD come from a per-app k8s Secret rather than
1Password. Phase 2 swaps this to Workload-Identity-issued OAUTHBEARER tokens —
the app code change is one line.
What can a knoe_developer do?
The per-engineer roles (chrisfu, ron) are members of the knoe_developer
group. Grants:
| Schema | Permission | Notes |
|---|---|---|
knoe |
SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE |
Application schema; ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES propagates to new tables |
public |
SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE |
Same |
auth |
SELECT only |
Read-only on Supabase GoTrue tables (debugging / inspection) |
storage |
SELECT only |
Read-only on Supabase storage tables |
extensions |
USAGE |
Lets queries reach extensions.pg_stat_statements etc. |
What you can NOT do:
- Drop / truncate
auth.*orstorage.*(read-only) ALTER ROLE,CREATE ROLE,CREATE EXTENSION(those are postgres-only)- Connect as
postgres,supabase_admin,authenticatorfrom outside the cluster - Connect at all without TLS (pg_hba
hostnossl ... reject)
Need broader access? Ask chrisfu — easier to extend the knoe_developer group
than to mint role-specific grants per engineer.
Onboarding a new engineer (admin-facing)
./etc/onboard_engineer.sh <username> <email>
Outputs:
- A one-time URL:
https://db.0.knoe.dev/onboard.html#user=...&pw=...&exp=... - A QR-code rendering of that URL (in your terminal, via
qrencode) - The plaintext temp password (fallback)
Deliver the URL to the new engineer via Gmail (to their @knoey.com address)
or by showing the QR on screenshare for them to scan with their phone. The
landing page handles all the engineer-side UX (copy buttons, connection
string, rotation guidance). They save the password to their personal
1Password — no shared vault required. See docs/onboarding.md.
The script idempotently CREATEs / ALTERs the role:
- LOGIN INHERIT VALID UNTIL
<now+24h> - PASSWORD set to a fresh 192-bit random
- GRANT knoe_developer
The pg_hba.conf hostssl all +knoe_developer all scram-sha-256 rule means
the new role is reachable via pg.0.knoe.dev immediately — no pg_hba edits
needed per onboard.
Other actions:
./etc/onboard_engineer.sh --rotate <username> # fresh 24h temp password
./etc/onboard_engineer.sh --revoke <username> # DROP ROLE
Rotate your password
The engineer-side path is \password inside psql — they pick a new password
locally, postgres updates the SCRAM verifier, the password never leaves their
machine. No coordination with chrisfu needed.
If chrisfu needs to issue a fresh temp password (engineer locked out,
forgot to rotate before VALID UNTIL expired):
./etc/onboard_engineer.sh --rotate <username>
Same delivery (URL/QR/email) as initial onboarding.
Troubleshooting
-
pg_hba.conf rejects connection for host ... no encryption— you setsslmode=disable. Useverify-full(requires the CA cert) orrequire(encrypted but not verified). -
pg_hba.conf rejects connection for host <ip>, user <u>, no encryption— you're on a network that's stripping TLS, OR your psql client is too old. Update libpq to ≥17. -
password authentication failed for user "<u>"— typically wrong password, but also fires for roles not in our allow list (postgres, knoe-db, etc.) when connecting from outside the cluster. Check you're using your own role. -
FATAL: role "<u>" is not permitted to log in— yourVALID UNTILlapsed. Ask for rotation.
Related
- Phase 2 plan (queued, owned by Junie): install/deploy.sh switches to
pg_oauthas the default until knoey-system/authority auth is live. Includes building a validator library against PG18'sOAuthValidatorCallbacksAPI and bundling into the knoe-db image. Seedocs/TODO.mdfollow-up for the active reference. - k3d build: same Service + cluster cert pattern in k3d mode. Owned by Junie alongside the install.sh true-up.
- knoe-auth Round 1: the longer-term identity story (Kerberos KDC + Java authority). Becomes the Phase 2 issuer when it deploys, but Phase 2 doesn't block on it — Google's issuer is sufficient for now.
Files
deploy/gcp/gke/knoe-db.yaml— CNPG cluster spec; pg_hba block, server cert SAN list.deploy/gcp/gke/knoe-db-external-lb.yaml— external TCP LoadBalancer Service.